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INTRODUCTION

This comparative essay represents an attempt to introduce a
measure of counterpoise in a growing and much-heralded development in
the world law of arbitration. Recent decisional law in the United States,
France, and other countries have challenged the strategic significance of
the concept of arbitrability in the legal regulation of arbitration. The
essay seeks, first, to clarify the function of arbitrability in the law of
arbitration and, second, to argue against its judicial deconstruction in
either the international or domestic context. The key objective of the
analysis is to demonstrate the vital role of demarcation that arbitrability
plays between state authority and the exercise of private rights. Despite
the vogue of liberal arbitration statutes and the concurrent movement
toward the privatization of political and judicial functions, it is
inconceivable that arbitrability would be reduced to a perfunctory status
in the legal conceptualization of arbitral adjudication. This essay first
examines developments in United States law and provides a critical
assessment of their implications for transborder and domestic adjudication
and the institution of arbitration. It then establishes a comparison
between United States and French laws on arbitration to determine
whether civil law courts address the issue of arbitrability any differently
than their United States counterparts. The study of United States, French,
and other European court opinions that follows clearly demonstrates that
the dilution of arbitrability in United States law is also occurring in
France and other European civil law jurisdictions. This essay criticizes
the "a-legal" approach to arbitration law on a number of grounds and
makes the case for greater moderation in defining the jurisdictional scope
of arbitral adjudication and its relationship to the legal system.
II.

ARBITRABILITY:

A DEFINITION

The concept of arbitrability is critical to the legal regulation of
arbitration.' It determines the point at which the exercise of contractual
freedom ends and the public mission of adjudication begins. In effect, it
establishes a dividing line between the transactional pursuit of private
rights and the courts' role as custodians and interpreters of the public
interest. Whenever contractual rights become intertwined with the

1. For a discussion of arbitration, including the concept of arbitrability see, e.g., 1
MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Gabriel M. Wilner rev. ed. Supp. 1993).
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exercise of sovereign state authority, designated juridical institutions are
generally necessary to effect justice.
Arbitrability manifests itself in two ways in the legal regulation of
arbitration: (1) as a means of gauging the validity and scope of the

arbitration agreement (contractual inarbitrability); 2 and (2) as a subject
matter defense to arbitration (substantive inarbitrability).3 Contractual
inarbitrability usually does not raise questions of fundamental policy or
intricate issues of doctrinal interpretation in the law of arbitration. Rather,
the law of contracts and its principles of construction are at the core of
determinations regarding whether the reference to arbitration exists and,
if so, whether it covers the dispute in question.'
Substantive inarbitrability represents the classical function of
arbitrability. It curbs the contractual right to arbitrate by holding that
certain subject matters are precluded from arbitration as a matter of law.'
Substantive inarbitrability can overlap with the public policy exception to
the validity of arbitration agreements and the enforceability of arbitral
awards. Public policy is a separate ground for challenging agreements
and awards,6 but it interfaces with substantive inarbitrability when it
prohibits arbitration because the claims in question pertain to matters of
public interest
In order to declare subject areas inarbitrable,
legislatures, and especially courts, must elaborate a working definition

2. Id. §§ 12:00-:02.
3. Id. § 8:06.
4. Parties can attack the jurisdictional authority of the arbitral tribunal by alleging that
the contract of arbitration is null and void or is non-existent. The controlling principle
is that disputes cannot be submitted to arbitration unless the parties have entered into an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Even when a valid agreement exists, a dispute can
fall outside its scope, making the dispute inarbitrable because of the parties' failure to
agree to submit that particular controversy to arbitration.
Under either set of
circumstances, the parties can enter into a submission agreement, proceed to a judicial
trial, or reach a settlement. See id. §§ 12:00-:02.
5. Id. § 8:06.
6. See DoMKE, supra note 1, § 19:02.
7. To illustrate, when an arbitral tribunal fails to provide a party with an opportunity to
be heard or present essential evidence, the resulting award would be unenforceable for
reasons of procedural lapses that converge with public policy. Substantive inarbitrability
does not play a role in such a challenge to an award. A dispute involving the application
of currency regulations or criminal sanctions, however, usually would be deemed
substantively inarbitrable because these regulations are part of mandatory law. Their
violation implicates the public interest or public policy. See generally id. §§ 4:02, 19:02:04.
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of the public interest and explain how a particular subject area is
integrated into or excluded from its domain.

The traditional basis for invoking substantive inarbitrability
centered upon the distinction between claims arising from contract and
claims brought pursuant to the provisions of regulatory laws.' Contract

disputes ordinarily involve matters relating to formation, governing law,
and performance (e.g., timeliness of payment, delivery, conformity to
specifications), as well as the defenses of frustration of purpose or
impossibility of performance. Disputes based on statutes (e.g., laws

pertaining to bankruptcy, commercial competition, currency transactions,
import-export, taxation, the sale of securities, and the validity of patents)
normally fall outside the contractual mandate of arbitral adjudication.9
The principal reason behind the distinction is that regulatory
statutes contain special safeguards and remedies and proscribe conduct for
the good of society. Therefore, these laws should not be applied and
interpreted by private tribunals and adjudicators. The litigation of
statutory claims in public judicial fora and according to established
procedures guarantees public debate and accountability and allows the
laws to develop dynamically in response to changes in the social or
political order. Statutory claims, therefore, are inarbitrable because they
implicate the vital principles upon which social organization was erected.

8. An analogy can be drawn between the distinction advanced in the text and the debate
on the question of what damages can be recovered in product liability suits under
warranty and under tort. The celebrated debate on this issue between the courts in Seely
v. White Motor, Co. and Santor v. A & M Karagheusianrepresented a dialogue on the
boundary between and on the gravamen of tort and contract causes of action. The
distinction between contract and statutory claims reflects the same type of discussion on
fundamental issues. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S.
858 (1986) (discussing whether injury to product itself falls under product liability or
contract); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985)
(discussing whether buyer is restricted to cause of action under Uniform Commercial
Code or should be allowed cause of action under negligence and strict liability principles);
Seely v. White Motor, Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965) (holding no distinction between
physical injury to property and personal injury); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207
A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965) (discussing doctrine of strict liability in tort).
9. For an illustration of the segregation of contract and statutory claims in French law
see, e.g., Decree No. 85-1387 of Dec. 27, 1985, art. 174, 1986 D.S.L. 1 (Fr.); Judgment
of Feb. 4, 1992, Cass. civ. Ire, 1992 D.S. Jur. 181 (Fr.).
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ARBITRABILITY FROM A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE

With the development of the recourse to arbitration and the
parallel decline in the efficiency of judicial administration, the stature of
the inarbitrability defense waned in some legal systems. In fact, areas
fundamental to the public interest and requiring exclusive judicial
jurisdiction are becoming fewer and more difficult to identify. In United
States law, for example, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) only
recognizes contractual inarbitrability, 0 and the grounds for reviewing
domestic arbitral awards do not include the public policy exception to
enforcement." Moreover, in several jurisdictions, statutes and decisional
law distinguish between substantive inarbitrability in its application to
domestic law and to matters of international arbitration.' 2 The content
of arbitrability, therefore, varies from one setting to another, making a
stable definition even more elusive. Substantive inarbitrability in the
domestic context is usually more restrictive than its international
counterpart because the regulatory authority and interests of the state are
stronger domestically.' 3
In international arbitration, the domestic

10. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16 (1993)) [hereinafter FAA]. § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides:
A written provision in any.. .contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction or refusal shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. § 2.
11. See id. § 16.
12. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, American and Other National Variationson the Theme
of Intenzational Commercial Arbitration, GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 143 (1988).
13. The rules of territorial sovereignty and political autonomy allow the state to enact
whatever regulatory laws best suit the needs of the national polity. Domestic perceptions
of substantive inarbitrability lose some of their effect when applied beyond national
borders, especially in matters pertaining to international commerce when "the sovereign
national state is not essentially interested." Clive M. Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution
of the TransnationalLaw of Commercial Transactions,in 2 THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 19, 21 (Norbert Horn & Clive M.
Schmitthoff eds., 1982).
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imperatives underlying the legislation have a reduced significance and
function.
The sovereign authority and mandate that accompany the statutes,
however, are not completely extinguished in their transborder extension.
The exercise of national political will is represented by legislative
enactments of statutory rights that nonetheless govern or are connected
to private commercial agreements. Despite calls for unitary arbitral
proceedings, maintenance of an autonomous arbitral system, and
recognition of the specialty of transborder justice, 4 controversy persists
in the international context over whether claims founded upon statutory
rights should be submitted to commercial arbitrators, who are, generally,
private adjudicators unfamiliar with the history, function, and
interpretation of the applicable statutes.
The primacy of national law over the needs of international
commercial adjudication is best illustrated by a feature of English
arbitration law. 5 When English commercial law governs a domestic or
international contract, the courts retain the right to supervise the merits
of the arbitral tribunal's determination. 6 A limited right of appeal to the
High Court exists."
This practice--objectionable on a number of
grounds--reintegrates merits supervision into arbitration law and
challenges the independence of the international arbitral process for the
sake of maintaining the would-be juridical integrity of national
commercial law. Nonetheless, this practice also provides the elements of
a basic system for safeguarding the inviolability of national regulatory
legislation in transborder arbitration. International contract claims
involving provisions of national regulatory law should be resolved by a
process that at least includes national judicial mechanisms and allows
them to exercise meaningful authority over determinations."
The English experience demonstrates that a national public law bar
or limit on the exercise of arbitral jurisdiction at the transnational level,
although a hindrance, is not fatal to the practical operation of the arbitral
14. See, e.g., Hans Smit, The Future of InternationalCommercialArbitration:A Single
TransnationalInstitution?, 25 COLUM. . TRANSNAT'L L. 9 (1986).
15. On English arbitration law, see SIR MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND (1989); A. H. Hermann,

Business andthe Law: Light in Arbitration'sObscure Corners, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1993,
at 17.
16. MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 15, at 456-58.
17. Id.
18. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Iternationalism:
Assessing the Folly of Mitsubishi, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265 (1986).
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process. 9 The implementation of such a procedure, in fact, could have
a number of benefits. For example, national regulatory law could be
enriched by its judicial application in the transborder commercial setting.
The scope and content of the law could be expanded and adapted to a
larger mission of settling international disputes. As a result, the
regulatory framework might improve. Statutory claims could become
arbitrable once national courts elaborate settled positions on major issues.
The disposition of statutory claims would then require only modest
judicial supervision.
A system under which arbitrability is progressively established, by
initial reliance upon judicial jurisdiction and then upon coordinated
judicial and arbitral authority, might lead to the elaboration of regulatory
laws with truly international dimensions. This process should achieve
more cogent results than an abdication of all sovereign legal authority and
a complete elimination of the function of substantive inarbitrability from
the process of international commercial arbitration. Maintaining a
sovereign role in the protection of rights created by state authority should
not be perceived as overly intrusive to the operation of a mechanism for
resolving contractual controversies.
The complexity of international commercial transactions and
litigation, however, further complicates the question."
Claims of
contractual breach can be met with allegations of statutory violations.
The mixed character of some claims make jurisdictional delineation
difficult. 2' On one hand, international arbitrators have the ability and
perhaps the right to rule no matter what statute or law governs the merits
of the litigation. On the other hand, a sovereign state's interests in
exercising its lawful regulatory authority are implicated by the arbitration
and any eventual award.

19. Approximately 10,000 arbitrations are done in London each year. See Mann, Preface
to LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT

(Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990).
20. See Carbonneau, supra note 12, at 149-51.
21. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
617-23 (1985).
22. The following discussion summarizes a debate among Andreas Lowenfeld, Hans Smit
and myself. See Carbonneau, supra note 18; Thomas E. Carbonneau, Mitsubishi: The
Folly of Quixotic Internationalism,2 ARB. INT'L 116 (1986); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The
Mitsubishi Case: Another View, 2 ARB. INT'L 178 (1986); Hans Smit, Mitsubishi: It is
Not What it Seems to Be, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 7 (1987). Upon reflection, Professor Smit's
commentary is the most persuasive, although few courts or commentators have seen the
case in that light. The proposal advanced in the text incorporates a number of

200

TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW

[Vol. 2:193

A possible resolution of the dilemma is to have arbitral tribunals
first rule on the significance of the statutory claim to the litigation. The
dispute would be inarbitrable only when the arbitrators conclude that the
litigation is principally related to the claim of statutory rights violations.
When the statutory claim is ancillary to the main dispute, as would be the
case with a counterclaim or possibly a defense to liability, the tribunal
could disregard it as inoperative in the context of international arbitration
and rule solely on the merits of the principal dispute.
The arbitral tribunal's authority to rule upon jurisdictional
challenges (kompetenz-kompetenz) would permit it to dispose of this
question initially. The tribunal's determination could then be made
subject to judicial review. The effectiveness of this procedure would
depend on the existence of a like-mindedness among arbitral tribunals and
the supervising courts. Such a cooperative alliance is not uncharacteristic
of the current international arbitral process.' Functioning properly, this
procedure would have the benefits of sustaining the role of arbitrability
in the international process and having the application of the concept
established by a mutuality of perspectives among arbitral tribunals and
national courts. Despite the time required to construct such a process and
the delay it would cause in individual proceedings, this form of
institutional cooperation would avoid a systemically costly all-or-nothing
approach, give national law a presence in the process, and preserve
arbitral autonomy. Moreover, it would allow arbitral tribunals to assert
openly their status as a "shadow" or unofficial court system for
transborder contract claims.
IV.

AN ASSESSMENT OF ARBITRABILITY

Arbitrability is vital to the legitimacy of the arbitral process. A
failure to elaborate and implement a functional concept of substantive,
and even contractual, inarbitrability could have dire consequences. A
breakdown of sovereign authority in both domestic and international
regulatory areas and of rights protection mechanisms might occur.
Fundamental concerns could disappear from the landscape of public
debate and scrutiny. The definition and implementation of core political

recommendations made by Professor Smit.
23. For example, 94 sovereign states have ratified the New York Arbitration Convention.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, openedfor
signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201208 (1988)) [hereinafter New York Arbitration Convention]. See also Carbonneau, supra
note 12.

19941

FRENCH AND AMERICAN ARBITRABILITY

rights and values might be relegated to an invisible and unaccountable
private sector. Increasing the mandate of the arbitral process might also
imperil its legitimacy and capabilities. Civil rights claims should not be
arbitrated in the same fashion as disputes concerning conformity to
contract specifications or delivery. Thus, the addition of statutory claims
could compromise arbitral operations and distort the adjudicatory purpose
of the mechanism.
The current tendency to minimize the application of substantive
inarbitrability, especially in the context of international arbitration, may
be a necessary part of forging a modern destiny and role for arbitration.
A new adjudicatory order may be developing that demands the reevaluation of traditional concepts and attitudes. The transborder
regulation of securities markets, for example, clearly implicates the public
interest of various states. A claim of securities fraud brought under a
given national law, however, can represent merely a contractual dispute
between two parties to a private transaction that, despite the origin of the
right, has no direct public law significance.24
The privatization of statutory claims via contract is a useful shield
against public policy and public law considerations. The rights to be
adjudicated, however, would not exist were it not for the governing
national statute and the enabling sovereign authority. Moreover, the
wholesale abandonment of substantive inarbitrability elicits an analytical
response that transcends the fear of the unfamiliar. Arbitrability goes to
the core of law and adjudication in any age and context. In a system
guided not only by history but also by reason, arbitrability cannot be
subdued to the point of extinction. Courts must remain legitimate.
Decisions must have a juridical basis. Legal rules cannot simply be
eviscerated to purge dockets, and the intrinsic meaning of rules cannot be
denied to facilitate business or the national export of professional
services.'

24. See Robert W. Hillman, Cross-Border Investment, Conflict of Laws, and the
Privatization of Securities Law, 55 LAWv & CONTEMP. PROBs. 331 (1992). See also
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518, reh'g denied 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
25. The export of professional services appears to have motivated the enactment of the
1979 UK Arbitration Act. Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42 (Eng.). In the United States, the
Supreme Court's decisional law on arbitration owes much to the Court's desire to achieve
efficiency in the federal court system. For further, more detailed discussion, see THOMAS
E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DIsPuTE RESOLUTION:

MELTING THE LANCES AND

DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 59-155 (1989); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the
U.S. Supreme Court: A Pleafor Statutory Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 231,
233 (1990).
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THE UNITED STATES LAW ON ARBITRABILITY

The United States legal system is unique even within the common
law tradition.26 From the reliance on civil juries to the awarding of
punitive, treble, and hedonic damages, to its development of contingency
fees and class action lawsuits, the United States legal system is the
fountainhead of creative, albeit unorthodox, contributions to legal science.
The systemic uniqueness is even more apparent when the United States
process is compared to its Romanist analogues in which civil codes,
professional jurists and bureaucracies, and fixed interpretative training
provide for more stable and predictable juridical determinations. While
some United States contributions cause consternation and are met with
disbelief in Europe,27 others are emulated and used to establish
precedent."
The United States law of arbitration, especially on the question of
arbitrability, falls squarely into the general pattern of United States legal
developments. The law of arbitration in the United States has undergone
several distinct stages of evolution, each responding to a particular view
of the role and mission of arbitration. First, Congress enacted the
FAA,29 which was the result of lobbying efforts of several commercial
organizations. It legitimized the contractual recourse to arbitration and
ended a longstanding practice of judicial hostility toward arbitration.3"
The FAA was premised on the pragmatic beliefs that merchants have the
right to seek a commercially-adapted brand of justice for contractual
disputes3 and that elaborate judicial proceedings are not necessary in
self-regulating private sectors.32
Second, the institutional recognition of the legitimacy of arbitration
was followed by a gradual federalization of the law of arbitration. 3 At

26. See generally COMPARATIVE LAW FOR THE GLOBAL LAWYER (Thomas E.
Carbonneau & L. Newman eds., forthcoming 1994).
27. For example, the awarding of treble damages in antitrust litigation and the pursuit
of discovery practices abroad by United States lawyers.
28. The best example is the export of United States law firm organization and the model
for commercial lawyering. Moreover, § 402A of the Restatement of Torts has been
influential in framing foreign laws as have antitrust laws.
29. Supra note 10.
30. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 25, at 105-06 and sources cited therein.
31. See id. at 105-06.
32. See id. at 140-41 n.3.
33. See id. at 107-14.
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first, the FAA was deemed to have created merely procedural rights;
however, it slowly acquired the status of substantive law as the process
of arbitration gained importance.' Interpreting Section 2 of the FAA as
a congressional command to uphold individuals' contractual recourse to
arbitration, the United States Supreme Court was determined to insulate
arbitration from any dilatory reference to unfavorable state legislation.35

As a consequence, most notably in specialized sectors like commerce and
labor, the FAA governed, provided there was some basis for applying
federal law (interstate commerce and the supremacy clause, for

example). 6
Third, these domestic developments converged with the United
States Supreme Court's elaboration of a federal court doctrine on
international commercial litigation and arbitration.37 The Court adopted
a highly internationalist view of transborder cases.38 It reasoned that
arbitration was a necessary component of the transnational commercial
process.39 Agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards, therefore, had to
be enforced.4" The Court emphasized the sanctity of contract and the

need for adjudicatory predictability in international commerce. 4'

Accordingly, disputes that could not be submitted to arbitration under
domestic law (securities and antitrust matters, for instance) could be

34. See id. at 108.
35. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 25, at 108, 110-12. For cases interpreting this section,
see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (emphasizing intent of FAA
was to provoke expeditious resolution of claims); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1 (1984) (holding federal legislation created duty on federal and state courts to apply
federal policy on arbitration in FAA); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (defining § 2 of FAA as congressional declaration of federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements).
36.

CARBONNEAU,

supra note 25, at 108.

37. New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 23; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614
(holding antitrust claims can be submitted to arbitration in international setting); Scherk,
417 U.S. at 506 (finding importance of arbitration outweighs public policy interest in
consumer protection in Securities Exchange Act); MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding forum selection clause valid where both parties had special
expertise and negotiation was at arm's length by experienced and sophisticated business
people).
38. See sources cited supra note 37.
39. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 506.
40. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
41. Id.
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submitted to arbitration in the international context.42 This dilution of
substantive inarbitrability for transborder commercial matters, the Court
reasoned, was necessary to further United States economic interests.43
Since the post-World War II world had changed and the United States
military and economic hegemony had been reduced, the Court concluded
that the United States no longer could transact international business on
its own terms.' 4
The elaboration of a distinct and more flexible policy on
international commercial arbitration was not unique to United States
law.45 In fact, it had become and was to continue to be a fundamental
part of modem arbitration statutes and the accompanying decisional
law.46 The transnationalism it embodied reflected the worldwide
consensus underlying the New York Arbitration Convention.47 The
critical point of difference was that, while other countries had relaxed
public policy and other enforcement requirements, the United States law
had in addition loosened the substantive inarbitrability defense. Unlike
the liberalization practice in other countries, the parallel developments in
the United States not only had made the judicial attitude toward
arbitration more accommodating, but also had expanded the jurisdictional
scope of arbitration to include statutory claims.48
In the final stage of its development under the aegis of the
Supreme Court's decisional law, the United States law on arbitration
gained a unitary character.49 The Court abandoned any mention of the
specialty of international commerce and proclaimed that what applied to
international arbitration also governed domestic arbitration."
The
Court's pronouncements were always embedded in references to the
FAA's provisions and to the original legislative purpose to validate the
right of contractual recourse to arbitration.51 Congressional amendments

42. Id. at 640; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516-17.
43. Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 628-32; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516-17.
44. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
45. See Carbonneau, supra note 12.
46. Id.
47. New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 23.
48. See Carbonneau, supra note 25.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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to the FAA subsequently confirmed the content of the Court's rulings, 2
making a legislative repeal or amendment of the "emphatic federal
policy" on arbitration unlikely. Accordingly, statutory claims based upon
the securities acts, antitrust laws, RICO, and even civil rights legislation
could be submitted to arbitration in a purely domestic setting. 3
Substantive inarbitrability no longer was a barrier to the right to select
merely another remedy or form of trial, known as arbitration.'

Contractual inarbitrability, in the form of a disparity of bargaining

52. In 1988, Congress enacted § 16 of the FAA, severely limiting appeal of judicial
rulings that confirm the recourse to arbitration and providing for appeal of judicial rulings
that disfavor arbitration. § 16 provides:
(a)

(b)

An appeal may be taken from(1)
an order(A)
refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of
this title,
(B)
denying a petition under section 4 of this title to
order arbitration to proceed,
(C)
denying an application under section 206 of this
title to compel arbitration,
(D)
confirming or denying confirmation of an award
or partial award, or
(E)
modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
(2)
an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying
an injunction against an arbitration that is subject to this
title; or
Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an
appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order(1)
granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2)
directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this
title;
(3)
compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4)
refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to the title.

9 U.S.C. § 16.
53. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (compelling arbitration
of ADEA age discrimination claim); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (enforcing predispute agreement to arbitrate between securities
investors and brokerage firm with respect to investors' Securities Act claims);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (enforcing predispute
arbitral agreement where investors brought claims under Securities Act and under RICO).
54. This statement refers to the Court's remark in Rodriguez and elsewhere that
arbitration was simply a form of trial that had no impact upon the substantive content of
the right under dispute. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 480. That characterization is hardly
plausible and clearly subject to challenge.
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position, adhesion, or a related but separate arbitration agreement,55 also
was eliminated as an obstacle to arbitral recourse.
In effect,
inarbitrability in both forms was relegated to a perfunctory status.

55. The latter allusion refers to the federal court practice of consolidation. See Maxum
Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 817 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1987) (permitting consolidation
of related arbitral proceedings between owner and contractor and between contractor and
subcontractor to promote efficiency); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping, 743
F.2d 635 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1061 (1984) (holding arbitral proceedings
could not be consolidated where separate arbitration agreements did not provide for
consolidation); Compania Espanola de Petroleos v. Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527 F.2d 966
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976) (upholding agreement to arbitrate executed
by owner's agent). See also David E. Branson & Richard E. Wallace, Jr., Court-Ordered
Consolidated Arbitrations in the United States: Recent Authority Assures Parties the
Choice, 5 J. INT'L ARB. 89 (1988). But see Government of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland v. The Boeing Company, 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that district court
may not order consolidation of separate arbitral proceedings involving same questions of
fact and law if parties have not agreed to consolidation). The FAA contains no mention
of consolidation. Some federal courts rely on Rule 42(a) and Rule 81(a)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to order consolidation of arbitral proceedings. The circuits are
divided on the question of consolidation: The Second Circuit espouses the view that the
federal courts can order consolidations without an arbitration agreement to that effect or
the consent of the parties. It employs an "interest of justice" analysis that looks to
common questions of law and fact between the proceedings, the complexity of the related
issues, and the danger of conflicting findings. But see Boeing, 998 F.2d at 68. The Fifth,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits take the position that consolidations cannot be
ordered unless the parties have consented and the arbitration agreement provides for
multiparty arbitration. The Fourth Circuit intermediates by stating that an agreement to
allow consolidation can be inferred from the parties' agreement. See Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Arbitrationand the MultipartyDispute: The Searchfor Workable Solutions,
72 IOWA L. REV. 473 (1987); T. Evan Schaeffer, Comment, Compulsory Consolidation
of CommercialArbitration Disputes, 33 ST. LOuIs U. L.J. 495 (1989).
Australia, Canada, Ecuador, England, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands also
provide for consolidation. The English practice requires the consent of both parties; Hong
Kong law gives the courts wide discretion to order consolidation with or without party
consent; while Australia follows the English practice of consensual consolidation. The
Netherlands Arbitration Act of 1986 allows parties to seek an order of consolidation,
'unless the parties have agreed otherwise." One party may seek consolidation and the
decision is within the court's discretion. See The Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986, art.
1046(1), translated in PIETER SANDERS AND ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE
NETHERLANDS ARBITRATION ACT 1986, 26 (1987). See generally ISAAK I. DORE,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MULTIPARTY COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1990); Julie C.
Chiu, Consolidationof Arbitral Proceedingsand International Commercial Arbitration,
7 J. INT'L ARB. 55 (1990); Howard S. Miller, Consolidation in Hong Kong: The Shui On
Case, 3 ARB. INT'L 87 (1987).
Consolidation may raise enforcement problems under Article V(I)(d) of the New
York Arbitration Convention. See G. BERNINI, CONSENSUAL MULTIPARTY ARBITRATION:
PRINCIPAL ISSUES RAISED IN JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS (1991).
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This extraordinarily radical development in United States
arbitration law coincided with the meteoric rise of the alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) movement and the concomitant paralysis of federal
judicial administration.5 6 ADR, arbitration especially, had been touted
by two successive Chief Justices as an essential alternative method of
dispensing justice. With increasingly limited public resources and the
volume of and delays associated with drug cases and other forms of
criminal litigation, the federal court system had become and remains
stymied by the enormity of dockets and elaborate constitutional criminal
protections.
ADR, arbitration in particular, offered a means of
channelling non-criminal litigation to private adjudicatory processes. The
1990 Civil Justice Reform Act5 manifested congressional affirmation of
the Court's view that federal courts no longer could effectively or
efficiently dispense justice in civil, commercial, and some political rights
cases.
In short, frontier politics prevailed in United States arbitration law.
Some interests had to be abridged or eliminated to afford safe passage to
other more important interests. The only means of salvaging the justice
system was to have arbitrators function as de facto federal judges in a
private setting and at the cost of the parties instead of the taxpayers. The
United States no longer could afford the brand of justice required by the
federal constitution. Lawyerly due process had turned on itself and the
system it served. 9 Only a few societal and political interests were given
the privilege of being guided by the rule of law.
As a further result, lawyers invaded the arbitration process.' The
due process principles that paralyzed the federal court system began to
infest arbitral proceedings. 6' Given that the arbitral process now ruled
upon significant litigious concerns, it needed to be judicialized.62 The

56. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 25, at 1-5 and sources cited therein.
57. See id. (referring to Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist).
58. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1993)).
59. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 25, at 1-5.
60. See Richard Karp, Wall Street's New Nightmare: ForBrokerage Firms,Arbitration
Has Turned Unexpectedly Nasty, BARRON'S, Feb. 21, 1994, at 15.
61. Id.
62. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, National Law and the Judicialization of Arbitration:
Manifest Destiny, Manifest Disregard, or Manifest Error, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATON" AND UNIFORMrrY?
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adjudicatory character of arbitration was transformed as a result of its
new mission and by the fact that it no longer was protected and
circumscribed by substantive and contractual inarbitrability.
The implications of this development for American society are as
extraordinary as the court decisions themselves. For all but criminal
prosecutions, citizens may seek recourse in the judicial system, which
requires waiting years before the federal dockets permit operation of due
process of law and equal protection, or agree to resolve their disputes
through private adjudication at their own cost.
Moreover, the
implementation and interpretation of substantial pieces of national
legislation, such as the securities laws, RICO, and the Sherman Act, are
delegated to private adjudicators sitting in confidential proceedings which
do not produce public opinions. The statutes do not involve matters of
timely delivery or frustration of purpose, but provide essential civil
liberties and consumer protection and articulate the nation's political and
economic creed. The solution to the problem of limited accessibility to
the judicial system makes federal justice even more inaccessible and gives
arbitration whatever claims that can be shoved in its direction on
whatever basis.63 The Bill of Rights, in effect, was amended, if not
rewritten, without any public discussion and without generating any
significant public or professional attention.'
The critical question for comparative purposes is whether the
decline of substantive inarbitrability, announced in the international
decisions and eventually followed in the domestic rulings, will be
perceived by other legal systems as a self-contained United States
eccentricity or as a development worthy of emulation. It is difficult to
understand the attraction of the federal case law.65 The domestic cases
are poorly reasoned and transparently designed to achieve a particular
result no matter how unconvincing the logic.' The Court appears to
care little about the institution of arbitration and its fate, and even less
about understanding its processes. The international cases have more
substantial and rigorous analytical content, but their reasoning and
rationale are embedded outright in policy. High-minded idealism is
masterfully combined with the dictates of pragmatism, giving the opinions
considerable currency in the age of globalization. Despite the ideological

63. See Carbonneau,supra note 25.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
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and intellectual glow of the international cases, they do not eliminate
skepticism about their central thesis.
Civil law courts demonstrated a more systematic and cogent
understanding of the law of arbitration in prior decisional rulings on the
subject. The civil law version of the legal regulation of arbitration is
founded upon the proposition that arbitration is a creature of contract and
that, pursuant to well-settled principles, the contractual recourse to
arbitration is limited to those areas in which rights fall within the domain
of contractual freedom (droits disponibles).67 The state maintains its
authority and responsibility to safeguard the public interest by
adjudicating claims that implicate the larger interests of society. In terms
of basic principles, the civil law recognizes a clear distinction between
contractual and statutory claims, between the jurisdictional domain of
arbitration and the public authority and adjudicatory duties of the
judiciary.
The Scherk v. Alberto-Culver and MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc. rulings, however, stand in contradistinction to the
traditional civilian view. Despite the recognition of court-ordered
consolidation in one European statute," the French Court of Cassation
appeared to hold fast to settled principles in a recent decision on multiparty arbitration, refusing to extend the effect of a contract beyond its
specifically agreed-upon perimeters and parties.69 Other recent French
judicial decisions, however, demonstrate that the United States Supreme
Court's decisional law on substantive inarbitrability has made
considerable inroads into French legal thinking, nearly acquiring the force
of precedent among French lower courts.
This unexpected shift of position is understandable in light of the
competition surrounding the export of arbitration laws and services. The
liberalization of rules for international matters gives the national
jurisdiction a non-nationalistic image and confirms its allegiance to
globalization. The elimination of arbitrability from the legal regulation
of arbitration, as if a more moderate approach is impossible, however,
remains difficult to understand and to accept even in transborder relations.
To their credit, the French opinions, no matter how staggering the final
disposition, still exhibit an intimate understanding of the institution of

67.

CODE

CIVIL

[C.

civ.] art. 2059 (Fr.).

68. The Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986, supra note 55, art. 1046.
69. See Judgment of Jan. 7, 1992, Cass. civ. Ire, 7 INT'L ARB. REP., Feb. 1992, at B-I
(Fr.).
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arbitration and rely upon the force of well-wrought logic to arrive at their
determinations.
VI.

THE FRENCH LAW ON ARBITRABILITY

French law distinguishes between objective and subjective
inarbitrability. 0 The distinction is roughly comparable to substantive
Objective inarbitrability prohibits
and contractual inarbitrability.
arbitration by reason of the subject matter of the dispute, while subjective
inarbitrability relates to deficiencies in contractual capacity or other
problems in the formation of the agreement.7' The purpose underlying
objective inarbitrability is to preserve the integrity of the public interest
in adjudication.72 Subjective inarbitrability regulates the contractual
validity of agreements to arbitrate in the context of particular arbitral
proceedings.73
In contrast to its United States counterpart, the French law on
arbitrability is based upon express provisions of law. Articles 2059 and
2060 of the Civil Code74 contain abstract formulations that outline the
general contours of substantive inarbitrability. Recourse to arbitration is
permitted in contractual matters, impliedly prohibited in the
adjudication of statutory rights and the application of mandatory law, and
expressly prohibited for matters that pertain to public policy.75
Article 2059 legitimizes the recourse to arbitration in the
adjudication of contractually accessible rights (droits disponibles).76
These are personal rights over which individuals have basic authority and
discretion.77 The rights that proceed from contract only implicate the
domain of public law in the sense that the exercise of individual rights

70. Patrice Level, L'Arbitrabilitif, REvUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 213, 219 (1992). This
difference is similar to the distinction between objective law (droitobjecti) and subjective
law (droit subjectij). JEAN-PIERRE GRIDEL, NOTIONS FONDAMENTALES DE DROIT ET
DROIT FRANgAIS: INTRODUCTION M .THODOLOGIE SYNTHtSES 7-8 (1992).

71. Level, supra note 70, at 232.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. C. civ. arts. 2059-2060.
75. Id.
76. Id. art. 2059. The Article provides that "all persons may make arbitration agreements
on rights of which they have the free disposition." Id.
77. Level, supra note 70, at 219.
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cannot violate the strictures of public policy.78 Moreover, such rights,
despite their private character, emerge from the political will of the state,
the ultimate purveyor of rights within political society.79
Statutory rights differ from contractually accessible rights."
Statutory rights are political commands, enacted in the name of the
common good, which are for or against certain types of conduct or
Within this category of rights, individual
groups in society.81
prerogative ceases and the collective interest takes hold.8" Statutory
rights, born not of contract but directly of political authority, are therefore
inarbitrable because their content and character transcend the private
realm of contractual privilege.83
Accordingly, Article 2059 expressly permits arbitration in the
domain of contract, while it impliedly precludes arbitration in subject
areas that the state regulates via statutes for the public good.84 Article
2060 reinforces the implied content of Article 2059 by prohibiting
arbitration generally in all matters pertaining to public policy." Article
2060 specifically lists areas in which the public policy bar to arbitration
applies, including matters of status and capacity, divorce, and disputes to
which the state is a party.86 Public policy matters, therefore, encompass
activities that can be performed only by a duly-constituted government
and that are instrumental to its political mandate and public mission."
Under Article 2060, a wide range of private disputes arising in a
variety of areas of French law were deemed inarbitrable for reasons of
public policy."8 The public policy bar in Article 2060 encompassed any

78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 220.
81. Id.
82. Level, supra note 70, at 220.

83. Id.
84. C. civ. art. 2059.
85. Id. art. 2060. The Article provides that "[t]here may not be arbitration agreements
on questions of status and capacity of persons, on those relative to divorce and judicial
separation or on disputes involving public organizations and public institutions and more

generally in all matters which concern public policy." Id. See also Judgment of Jan. 20,
1989, Cour d'appel de Paris, REvUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 280, 288 (1989) (Fr.).
86. C. civ. art. 2060.
87. GRIDEL, supra note 70, at 74.
88. Level, supra note 70, at 234-35.
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dispute involving the application or interpretation of mandatory law. 9
For example, the imposition of criminal liability and sanctions, although
not specifically mentioned in Article 2060's abbreviated list, presumably
fit into its purview because the criminal process compromises individual
rights as it acts to further public security.' In the civil setting, statutes
establishing rights for groups of individuals, especially for reasons of
ideological or political conviction, also implicated public policy and were,
therefore, outside the contractual privilege of arbitral recourse.9 Labor
laws are a particularly good illustration of such laws in the French and
European context.
In addition to the matters specifically enumerated and those
integrated by implication into the prohibition of arbitration under Article
2060, one would assume that litigation pertaining to testamentary
dispositions, immovable property, and family law matters, including, but
not limited to, the pronouncement of divorce, would be substantively
inarbitrable as well.9 2
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, therefore, the effect of
substantive inarbitrability remains particularly vigorous when the state
acts to give identity to the polity and its members (e.g., attributing civil
status, legal capacity, nationality, marital status) or to limit the freedom
or property rights of individuals for general security purposes (e.g.,
criminal liability and sanctions), or when basic and essential individual
rights are at stake (e.g., political liberties, privacy, and personality
interests).93 Arbitrators cannot rule on these matters because they pertain

89. Id.
90. Id. at 227.
at 228.
91. Id.
92. Public law matters involving the relationship between the state and private

individuals also come within the ambit of the public policy bar in Article 2060. French
law distinguishes between private law (droit prive) and public law (droit public).
According to Gridel, droit privi is "le droit de la reconnaissance, de la defense et de la
mise en oeuvre des int~r&s privds" and droit public "institute les personnes et pouvoirs
publics, d6finissant, outre les activitds de ceux-ci, les modes de gestion des services
publics. Il est la mise en oeuvre du regime de puissance publique." GRIDEL, supra note
70, at 82, 73. In civil law systems, public law matters are subject to an entirely separate
body of law, court system, and supreme court. See id. at 75. This exercise of state
authority involves a more complex measure of legal accountability than the civil litigation
of private disputes. See id. State conduct always implicates a public mission that
involves collective interests. But see (as to international matters) Yves Gaudemet,
L'Arbitrage: Aspects de Droit Public, Etat de la Question, Revue de L'Arbitrage 241
(1992).
93. GRIDEL, supra note 70, at 530.
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to the state's basic mission and core functions. 9' This is precisely the
meaning of public policy as it relates to substantive inarbitrability.
Although the architecture of the Civil Code establishes clear
guidelines for defining the scope of arbitral jurisdiction, the French courts
began to question key concepts and discover definitional ambiguity in the
provisions. When does a right become accessible by contract? When is
public policy an absolute bar to the arbitration of a claim involving an
alleged breach of a statutory right? What if a dispute implicates
mandatory law only in a subsidiary fashion?
The development of a more subtle domestic decisional law on
substantive inarbitrability began in 1950 with Tissot v. Neff." The
objective of the ruling was to develop a judicial doctrine that would
compensate for the absence of kompetenz-kompetenz 9 in the prevailing
French arbitration law. The lack of arbitral authority to rule on
jurisdictional challenges allowed parties to undermine the reference to
arbitration by alleging that the dispute involved public policy violations.
Such challenges at least delayed and could completely undermine the
arbitral tribunal's ability to rule on the dispute.
In an attempt to remedy the lacuna, the French Court of Cassation
ruled that the mere convergence of public policy provisions with the
merits of a contractual dispute did not necessarily render the dispute
inarbitrable. Emphasizing the central importance of Article 2059,"7 the
Court established the doctrine of the selective inarbitrability of statutory
rights. Although the subject matter of some disputes was per se
inarbitrable, other disputes could be submitted to arbitration if the
statutory provision generated an actionable individual right in the
circumstances." In effect, the Court held that disputes involving claims

94. Id.
95. Judgment of Nov. 28, 1950 (Tissot v. Neff), Cass. com. [1950] Bull. Civ., No. 316,
at 154 (Fr.) [hereinafter Tissot].
96. See Nouv. c.

PR. CIV.

art. 1466, which provides "si, devant l'arbitre, l'une des parties

conteste dans son principe, ou son 6tendue le pouvoir juridictionnel de l'arbitre, il
appartient Acelui-ci de statuer sur la validit6 ou les limites de son investiture." Id. See
also Judgment of May 19, 1993 (Soci&t6 Labinal v. Socidtds Mors et Westland
Aerospace), Cour d'appel de Paris, REVUE DE L'ARBrrRAGE 645 (1993) (Fr.) [hereinafter
Labinal] (permitting reference to arbitration in dispute implicating international public
policy issues).

97. Tissot, [1950] 7 Bull. Civ. No. 316 at 154.
98. See generally Level, supra note 70, at 222, 232, 233, 236, 237. Article 2060
reflected the nineteenth century precept of non-interventionist government policy in
economic matters. After 1950, as an activist French government policy developed and
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Rather, such

disputes became selectively inarbitrable, or inarbitrable only when a
statutory breach had actually taken place."° In the Court's view,
inarbitrability arose, not from the mere application of mandatory law to
a dispute, but from a direct public policy violation.'
This rather opaque distinction, in effect, gave arbitrators ruling
under French law the equivalent of competence sur la compitence

authority.

2

Arbitrators now could determine for themselves (subject

to later judicial review) whether a public policy violation had taken place
and prevented them from ruling on the merits. It also created confusion
among doctrinal writers and lower courts.0 3 As the ruling took hold,

statutory economic law grew, Article 2060 became obsolete. The activist state began to
intervene either to proscribe or prescribe certain types of conduct in the furtherance of the
public good, protection of creditors, or maintenance of the integrity of the marketplace.
As a result, the application of these laws triggered disputes between private parties, and
questions arose as to whether provisions for arbitration remained lawful in regard to those
claims.
In an attempt to adapt the law to this evolution, the French Court of Cassation
shifted the central analytical reference from Article 2060 to Article 2059 by distinguishing
between disputes that were per se inarbitrable and disputes that merely involved
allegations of a violation of mandatory law. Under Article 2059, disputes that were per
se inarbitrable either directly implicated public policy or centered upon contractually
inaccessible rights.
99. Tissot, [1950] 7 Bull. Civ. No. 316 at 154. See generally Level, supra note 70.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Judgment of June 15, 1956, Paris Ire, 1956 J.C.P. H, No. 9419 (Fr.); Judgment of
May 7, 1963, Cass. Civ. Ire, 1963 J.C.P. H, No. 13405 (Fr.); Judgment of Nov. 29, 1968,
Colmar 2e, 1970 J.C.P. II, No. 16246 (Fr.). These cases attempted to prevent dilatory
tactics form frustrating the recourse to arbitration. The claim of public policy violation
could send the matter to court because the agreement to arbitrate might also be void. The
rulings allowed the arbitrators to determine whether public policy had indeed been
violated. These problems were eventually eliminated by the judicial and legislative
recognition of the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine in both domestic and international
arbitration. See Judgment of May 7, 1963, supra; Nouv. C. PR. CIV. art. 1466.
103. The principle received a surprisingly wide application in a number of areas. For
example, the doctrine of selective inarbitrability has affected the inarbitrability of both
matrimonial and testamentary rights. See Judgment of Jan. 25, 1963, Cass. civ. 2e, 1964
J.C.P. II, No. 13472 (Fr.) (settling community property dispute by arbitration); Judgment
of Nov. 7, 1974, Cass. civ. 2e, REVUE DE L'ARBTRAGE 302 (1975) (Fr.) (settling dispute
regarding share in estate by arbitration). Its application to labor law rights also created
controversy. It should be noted that French labor and social security laws provide a
complete and comprehensive protection to employees; in certain cases, this protection
includes criminal penalties for violations. See Decree No. 85-1388 of Dec. 27, 1985, art.
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however, it came to represent the view that the presence of public policy
in litigation, especially regulatory provisions involving economic
issues," could not prevent arbitrators from fulfilling their adjudicatory
responsibilities under the contract. It, therefore, became increasingly
difficult to identify subject areas that were inarbitrable. In fact, under
Article 2060, only matters of status and capacity and the fundamental

rights of privacy and personality, as well as bankruptcy protection and
patent infringement, are now clearly within the reach of substantive
inarbitrability under the French law. 5
As a consequence, the French courts have held that the statutes
establishing special rights for employees, consumers, and lessees, for
example, allow some measure of private contractual determination.0 6
While public policy may prohibit the arbitration of employee claims
arising from the performance of an employment contract, arbitration may
be invoked once the violation of a statutory right occurs."° The French
courts reason that the statutory protections afforded to employees,
conferred as a matter of political authority, are established for the benefit
Generally, these rights are per se inarbitrable
of private individuals.'
174, 1986 D.S.L. 84 (Fr.); Law No. 78-742 of July 13, 1978, art. 57, 1978 D.S.L. 315
(Fr.).
104. See Laurence Idot, ArbitrabilitJ et Application du Droit de la Concurrence par

l'Arbitre, REVUE DE L'ARBrrRAGE 280 (1989).
105. As a matter of principle, the basic rule of decision for arbitrability is clear:

Statutory rights cannot be submitted to arbitration. The rule is akin to the prohibition in
French law against plea-bargaining. Under French notions, a defendant cannot barter
about what the criminal law provides. Courts do justice according to law and in the name
of the state. Their jurisdiction in these matters is exclusive and clearly intolerant of
private party interference. The analogy between substantive inarbitrability and pleabargaining is pertinent, however, only at the level of abstract principle. See also
Judgment of Feb. 4, 1992, Cass. civ. Ire, [1992] Bull. civ. No. 38, at 28 (Fr.) (reversing
Judgment of Jan. 26, 1990, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1991 D.S. Jur. 127). The law of July
13, 1978, however, provides that the Tribunal de grande instance has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear these disputes, and a number of commentators view infringement cases
as involving a determination of the validity of the patent. Law No. 78-742, 1978 D.S.L.
at 315.
106. Judgment of Nov. 5, 1984, Cass. soc., 1985 J.C.P. II, No. 20510 (Fr.); Judgment
of Dec. 30, 1954, Cass. soc., 1955 D. Jur. 321 (Fr.); Law No. 48-1360 of Sept. 1, 1948,
art. 16, 1948 J.C.P. III, No. 13528 (Fr.).
107. Judgment of Nov. 5, 1984, at 1985 J.C.P. II, No. 20510. See C. TRAY. art. 511-1.
The Article states "les conseils de prud'hommes,...r~glent par voie de conciliation les
diffdrends qui peuvent s'd1ever h l'occasion de tout contrat de travail.. entre les
employeurs.. .et les salarids qu'ils emploient." Id.
108. See cases cited supra note 105.
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and subject to the mandatory jurisdiction of the designated courts when
they are expressions of social and political public policy."° As a right
benefitting a particular individual, however, they become part of droits
disponibles, enter the domain of contractual prerogatives, and become
arbitrable." 0
The French Court of Cassation itself has held that disputes
pertaining to an employment contract, such as overtime pay, paid
vacations, promotions, or severance allowance, are inarbitrable only for
as long as the contract of employment is in effect."' The rationale for
specialized remedies before the labor courts is to realign the disparity of
position between employers and employees during the period of
employment."' Employees must be protected while they are under the
employer's authority and supervision." 3
Once the contract of
employment is terminated, however, employee disabilities cease." 4 At
this point, the statutory right is transformed into a contractually accessible
right, arbitrable through a submission agreement." 5
Another example is the French law on leases. These laws contain
strict regulatory provisions which prevent over-reaching by setting rental
amounts and terms for the renewal of leases." 6 Despite the public
policy character of these regulations, parties can refer disputes to
arbitration." 7 Arbitrators can rule on the rent due under a residential
lease as long as the ruling on the amount owed is within the mandatory
statutory limits."' Arbitrators also can rule on claims pertaining to the
right of renewal, provided the lease is terminated at the time of
arbitration." 9 Public policy merely prohibits a breach of the right.

109. GRIDEL, supra note 70, at 530.
110. Judgment of Nov. 5, 1984, at 1985 J.C.P. II, No. 20510.
111. Id.
112. Level, supra note 70, at 227.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Judgment of Dec. 30, 1954, Cass. soc., 1955 D. Jur. 321 (Fr.); Law No. 48-1360
of Sept. 1, 1948, art. 16, 1948 J.C.P. III, No. 13528 (Fr.).
117. See cases cited supra note 105.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Once a breach occurs, some of the consequences of the violation can be
arbitrated.'
The doctrine of selective inarbitrability of statutory rights has
enabled the French courts to redefine the significance and role of
substantive inarbitrability in French domestic law. The distinction
between the inarbitrability of statutory rights and the arbitrability of the
consequences of a breach of a statutory right, which vest a personal
contractual right at the time of breach, upholds the principle of the code
provisions, but is coterminous with United States common-law precedent.
The stature and scope of substantive inarbitrability have dwindled subtlety
but mightily. A few areas, such as bankruptcy and patent infringement,
remain where French law maintains a public-law-inspired concept of
inarbitrability, but the tendency is clearly toward nearly unlimited
arbitrability.

VII.

THE FRENCH CONCEPT OF INARBITRABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION

Recent landmark cases reflect a substantial alignment of the
French law on arbitrability with its United States counterpart in the
international area as well.' Given the Court of Cassation's ruling on
the consolidation of related but different international arbitral
proceedings," it was plausible that the French approach toward
transborder arbitral jurisdiction might provide some necessary legal limits
upon the process, while remaining a strong proponent of the mechanism.
In light of Socigt6 Labinal v. Socijtgs Mors et Westland Aerospace"
and arbitration decisions in other European jurisdictions, 4 however, the
aspiration toward order and structure in the world law of arbitration will
seemingly be disappointed.

120. Id.
121. These decisions have been decided by the strategically important Paris Court of
Appeal. This Court has prepared the way for the elaboration of the most significant
developments in French arbitration law.
122. See, e.g., Judgment of Jan. 7, 1992, Cass. Civ. Ire, 7 INT'L ARB. REP., Feb. 1992,
at B-I (Fr.).

123. Labinal, REVUE

DE L'ARBITRAGE

645.

124. See cases cited infra notes 140, 142.
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Socijt6 Ganz v. Socidtd Nationale des Chemin de Fers
Tunisiens,1 " decided in 1991, extended the Tissot reasoning into
international arbitration and set the stage for an ambitious re-evaluation
of public policy and substantive inarbitrability in international arbitration
cases. It represented the first step in assigning substantial and fully
autonomous powers over public policy and the implementation of
arbitrability to international arbitrators. The Paris Court of Appeal ruled
that arbitrators have not only the authority but also the jurisdictional right
to apply the rules of international public policy."6 Their task as private
judges includes the responsibility of assuring party compliance with these
rules." International arbitrators, therefore, may even impose sanctions
for the 8parties' failure to abide by the rules of international public
12
policy.
In Ganz, the redirection of the French law of arbitrability led to an
elaboration of a rather spectacular rule of law for international arbitration.
With the new emphasis on Article 2059 in French domestic law,
arbitrators were prevented from ruling only when adjudication of the case
clearly involved an actual violation of a public policy statute. In
international arbitration, the rule became even more accommodating:
arbitrators were declared custodians of international public policy and
could rule on public policy violations as long as they did not attempt to
impose criminal sanctions.
Labinal completed the French judicial deconstruction of the
international public policy bar and shifted judicial focus to the substantive
inarbitrability defense.'29 The Paris Court of Appeal eliminated any
lingering doubts about the import of the French international decisional
law. After Labinal, statutory claims can be submitted to international
arbitration and the public policy underlying the national law giving rise
to the statutory claim is completely ineffective to preclude the reference
to arbitration.3 0
In Labinal, the litigation involved Community competition
laws13 1 and, consequently, the allegation that national courts and the

125. Judgment of Mar. 29, 1991 (Soci6t6 Ganz v. Socit6 Nationale des Chemin de Fers
Tunisiens), Cour d'appel de Paris, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 478 (1991) (Fr.).
126. Id. at 480.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Labinal, REVUE DE L'ARBrRAGE at 650.
130. Id. at 650.
131. Id. at 646.
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European Court of Justice had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the
dispute.132 The Paris Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding
that:
[I]n matters international, the arbitral tribunal assesses its
own jurisdictional authority in regard to the arbitrability of
the dispute pursuant to international public policy and has
the authority to apply the principles and rules that emerge
from it and to sanction instances of non-compliance under
the supervision of the court of enforcement.133
The Court added that, although international arbitrators could not grant
injunctions or assess fines, they "could nonetheless impose civil liability

for conduct
they found to violate the rules of [international] public
34
policy."'
The French rulings parallel the United States Supreme Court
decision in Mitsubishi. Mitsubishi also held that the specialty of
transborder commerce and the autonomy of the international arbitral
process required arbitrators to have the jurisdictional capacity to rule upon
statutory claims.'35 In effect, both the United States and French courts
appointed international arbitrators, rather than national legislatures, as
custodians and, ultimately, as promulgators of international public
policy.'36 Given the breadth of the holdings, international public policy

132. Id.
133. Id. at 650.

134. Labinal, REVUE

DE L'ARBITRAGE

at 650. The Court of Appeal confirmed its

holding in a subsequent case. See Judgment of Oct. 14, 1993 (Socirt6 Aplix v. Socirt6
Velcro), Cour d'appel de Paris, REvUE DE L'ARBTRAGE 164 (1994) (Fr.) [hereinafter
Velcro]. The Court reiterated the basic tenets of the Ganz-Labinal doctrine: A dispute
is arbitrable even though a public policy provision applies to the dispute. In matters of
international arbitration (e.g., in the application of EC competition laws), arbitrators have
the authority to assess their jurisdictional authority according to international public
policy. They can apply public policy provisions and impose civil liability for their
breach, subject to the scrutiny of the court of enforcement. Arbitrators, however, cannot
impose fines. The Velcro decision adds that international arbitrators, like national courts,
cannot assert jurisdiction over EC matters that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of EC
institutions, such as the European Commission. Nor can they apply EC laws relating
solely to institutions, rather than individuals. See Charles Jarosson, Ripertoire pratique
de l'arbitragecommercial international,REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 170 (1994).
135. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37.

136. Labinal, REVUE
653, 655.

DE L'ARBITRAGE at 645. See also Jarrosson, supra note

134, at
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includes not only competition law, but also every other type of economic
regulation including tax, currency, and customs.'37 In each case, the
delegation of jurisdictional authority is accompanied by the caveat that
the arbitral tribunal's disposition of the statutory claim can be supervised
by the court of enforcement. 3 In both Mitsubishi and Labinal, the
formulation for safeguarding the national public interest hardly addresses
the true practical concerns. It is not clear, for example, whether the
relevant court will have any interest in the statutory law or be willing to
engage in a merits review prohibited by the New York Arbitration
Convention.139
The French courts are not alone in succumbing to the aura of
Mitsubishi and the surfeit of liberality in regard to international
arbitration. A Swiss federal tribunal recently nullified an international
arbitral award because the arbitral tribunal did not base the award on
European Community competition law.'" The arbitral tribunal refused
to apply Community law on the ground that it was only empowered by
contract to apply Belgian law.'41 In light of the federal tribunal's
decision, it seems that international arbitrators not only are justified in
ruling upon public policy matters, but also are obligated to do so
whenever the dispute demands it. Thus, substantive inarbitrability not
only cannot prevent arbitration in matters of regulatory law, but also
forces arbitrators to rule on regulatory matters even when they believe
that they have no jurisdiction over such issues.
Another example of the excessive liberality in international
arbitration law is found in an opinion issued in 1992 by the German
Supreme Court for Civil, Commercial, and Criminal matters.'42 The
Court suggested that customary trade usage could serve as a basis for an
implied arbitration agreement in a sales contract that omitted the reference
to arbitration. 43 The holding represents yet another challenge to the
viability of the arbitrability concept. It appears to attack directly the
function of the contractual inarbitrability defense. Private agreements to
arbitrate no longer provide exclusive access to the arbitral process.

137. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637.
138. See Jarrosson, supra note 134, at 656.
139. See Carbonneau, supra note 18.

140. See Judgment of Apr. 28, 1992, REVUE
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124, 136 (1993).

141. Id. at 134-35.

142. Judgment
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Eminent French doctrinal writers have advanced a host of reasons
to sustain the latest national contribution to international arbitral
autonomy.1"
The Labinal ruling is seen variously as necessary,
inevitable, and highly desirable.'45
To complete the parallel to
Mitsubishi and its progeny, one commentator suggests that the Labinal
ruling also should apply to matters of domestic arbitration.'" The
proponents of the majority trend believe steadfastly that public policy
considerations should never interfere with the exercise of the arbitral
mandate. 47 Arbitral tribunals should be empowered to rule and assess
the scope and foundation of their own jurisdictional authority.14 Public
policy considerations linked to statutory regulations should not prevent
arbitrators from undertaking and fulfilling their adjudicatory
functions.'4 9 The contract of arbitration should mean that arbitrators
rule. The dictates of public policy or of juridical subject matter should
not frustrate that contractual command.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

Although the tempo and logic differ, "a-legality"' 5 informs the
arbitral decisional law of the United States Supreme Court and the French
courts alike. Each madness has its own method. The United States Court
simply denies the existence of arbitrability's traditional function and
supplants it with its own version of how it should operate. The French
courts, ever faithful to the canons of Romanist interpretation, peel away
at the content of existing rules until the subtlety of distinctions silently
alters and eventually undermines the rules. Given the decisions of other
national courts, it is clear that a-legality has become the new heading of
world arbitration law.'
Arbitration, privatization, and globalization are the new
watchwords. At the end of the day, transborder adjudication will be

144. See Bertrand Moreau, Introduction to REVUE DE L'ARBrIRAGE 193 (1992).
145. Id.
146. See Jarrosson, supra note 134, at 658.
147. Moreau, supra note 144, at 195-98.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, A-legality and Arbitration: The German Supreme
Court Joins the Fray, 4 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. (forthcoming 1994).
151. For a discussion of world arbitration law, see id.
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guided by the dictates of the marketplace and the international
commercial community and completely exempt from the reach of
sovereign national authority. Law will be generated within the confines
of a fully privatized system that is unaccountable to any public
organization or process. Arbitrators, lawyers, arbitral institutions, and law
firms will become the de facto government and the courts of international
trade and commerce.
The abuses that may arise from this new legal abandonment of
arbitration probably can be averted or cured by the growing participation
of lawyers in the process and by the professionalism of arbitrators and
arbitral institutions. The likely effect, however, will be the development
of the arbitral process into not only a de facto court system, but also an
adjudicatory mechanism governed by lawyerly "values." Ironically, these
values initially triggered the migration both internationally and
domestically toward the arbitral process.

